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FOREWORD 
 
This report analyzes Albuquerque, New Mexico’s new system of public campaign 
financing for municipal elections. Adopted by city voters in 2005, Albuquerque’s “Open 
and Ethical Elections” program offers qualifying candidates significant amounts of full or 
“clean money” to fund their campaigns. The city has now conducted two elections under 
its new system.  
 
Based on historical reviews of past Albuquerque elections, interviews with candidates 
and expert observers, constitutional and legal analyses of Albuquerque’s law and 
examinations of campaign contribution, spending and public financing data for two city 
elections, this report concludes that Albuquerque’s new law has successfully met its 
goals—to curtail excessive electoral spending, foster issue debates, reduce candidate 
dependence on private contributions and encourage widespread candidate participation. 
The report offers several recommendations to improve the law’s operation and preserve it 
against potential constitutional challenges. 
 
CGS has studied public financing of campaigns for over 25 years. It has 
 published several general reports on public financing, including a comprehensive 
analysis of state and local jurisdictions, Keeping It Clean: Public Financing in 
American Elections (2006); a primer, Investing in Democracy: Creating Public 
Financing Elections in Your Community (2003); and a report on innovative ways to 
fund public financing programs, Public Financing of Elections: Where to Get the 
Money? (2003). 
 
CGS has also published detailed, jurisdiction-specific analyses of public financing 
programs in numerous state and local jurisdictions, including: Public Financing: 
North Carolina Judiciary (2009), Public Campaign Financing in Florida: A Program 
Sours (2008); Public Campaign Financing in Wisconsin: Showing Its Age (2008); 
Public Campaign Financing in New Jersey—Governor: Weeding Out Big Money in 
the Garden State (2008); Public Campaign Financing in New Jersey—Legislature: A 
Pilot Project Takes Off (2008); Public Campaign Financing in Minnesota: Damming 
Big Money in the Land of 10,000 Lakes (2008); Public Campaign Financing in 
Michigan: Driving Towards Collapse? (2008); Political Reform That Works: Public 
Campaign Financing Blooms in Tucson (2003); A Statute of Liberty: How New York 
City’s Campaign Finance Law is Changing the Face of Local Elections (2003); Dead 
On Arrival? Breathing Life into Suffolk County’s New Campaign Finance Reforms 
(2003); On the Brink of Clean: Launching San Francisco’s New Campaign Finance 
Reforms (2002); and Los Angeles: Eleven Years of Reform: Many Successes, More to 
be Done (2001). Copies of CGS reports are available at www.cgs.org and 
www.policyarchive.org. 
 
CGS thanks the public officials, administrators and advocates in Albuquerque and 
New Mexico who provided valuable information, insights and observations about the 
city's public campaign financing system. 
  
 
Senior fellow Molly Milligan authored Public Campaign Financing in Albuquerque: 
Citizens Win with Clean Money Elections. Editorial insight was provided by Tracy 
Westen and Bob Stern provided editorial insight. Legal interns Katy Wurzbach and 
Roya Rahmanpour provided valuable drafting and research assistance.  
  
CGS is a non-profit, national non-partisan organization that creates innovative 
political and media solutions to help individuals participate more effectively in their 
communities and governments. 
 
The Rockefeller Brothers Fund provided a generous grant to make this report 
possible. The foundation, however, is not responsible for the statements and views 
expressed in this report. 
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1 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
“It was one of the cleanest elections I could have hoped for.” 
      Randy Autio, former Albuquerque City Clerk 
 
“The voters won; it was money well spent.” 
      Steve Allen, New Mexico Common Cause 
 
 
 After two election cycles offering full public campaign funding for qualified 
municipal candidates, the City of Albuquerque should be proud of the successes of its 
Open and Ethical Elections program (OEE). Of Albuquerque's ten current elected city 
officials, eight won their seats using public financing. Candidates have reduced their 
campaign spending. Citizens have seen a return to a form of “retail” politics characterized 
more by personal contacts with candidates than expensive media advertising. The 
program has reduced the appearance of undue influence by large campaign donors. 
Voters have embraced Albuquerque’s public campaign financing program, and 
officials contacted said they would use the program again instead of raising private 
donations. None of them needed supplemental “opposing funds” during their campaigns 
to rebut messages by privately-funded opponents or independent groups. The “clean 
money” system has an annual budget of one-tenth of one percent of Albuquerque’s 
General Fund, yet the city actually expended only $140,000 in 2007 and $1.094 million 
2009, about 76% of the total available over the two election cycles,.   
In Albuquerque's recent 2009 campaign for mayor, voters witnessed an aggressive 
campaign funded entirely by tax dollars. The three mayoral candidates were not diverted 
from the issues by fundraising pressures. They each critiqued the positions of the others; 
avoided funding by special interests; campaigned “closer to the people” in meetings and 
2 
debates; avoided extensive televised advertising campaigns; and stayed within prescribed 
expenditure limits.  Their spending decreased dramatically from the previous mayoral 
campaign.  
The election successfully met the goals set five years earlier by Albuquerque 
citizens when they voted overwhelmingly for Open and Ethical Elections: to avoid real or 
apparent corruption from large contributions; to strengthen public confidence in 
governmental and election processes; to give candidates adequate funding to run 
competitive campaigns; to increase the accountability of elected officials to constituents, 
not contributors; and to insure a fair, responsible and ethical municipal election process. 
 Since its implementation following the 2005 election, the OEE has: 
• Reduced municipal campaign expenditures dramatically to the lower 
spending levels sought when city residents voted enthusiastically in 
support of the OEE. 
 
• Generated campaigns characterized by vigorous debates of issues, rather 
than aggressive media campaigns funded by special interests. 
 
• Encouraged over 60% of candidates appearing on the municipal ballot to 
accept public financing, including all three 2009 mayoral candidates. 
 
• Encouraged participation by eight of the ten current elected officials, 
including three newcomers to the municipal stage, two of whom were 
newcomers to elected politics. 
 
• Witnessed no apparent misuses of funds or spending violations by 
candidates. 
 
• Saw significant private opposition funds trigger supplemental matching 
funds in just one race, indicating that privately-funded candidates and 
"measure finance committees" (local, non-candidate political committees) 
may have voluntarily moderated their spending. 
 
This report recommends that the Albuquerque City Council should adopt the 
following improvements to strengthen its Open and Ethical Elections program. These 
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recommendations will help protect the city against constitutional attacks, safeguard 
taxpayer monies, increase the credibility of campaign spending using those dollars and 
improve the transparency of OEE-funded campaigns. 
 
 1. Albuquerque should amend its “Opposing Funds” provision in the City Charter 
if the United States Supreme Court invalidates matching funds provisions in public 
campaign financing programs. Albuquerque's provision currently provides candidates 
with additional public funding to meet high spending by privately financed candidates 
and measure finance committees as an incentive to participate in the program. The city 
should, in the alternative, provide candidates with additional public funding when voters 
are shown to lack sufficient information to make informed choices at the polls. These 
new incentives would not chill or threaten nonparticipating candidates’ First Amendment 
rights. 
 
2. The Council should extend by four weeks the qualifying period in which mayoral 
candidates may gather $5 contributions. This would make it easier for mayoral 
candidates to participate in the OEE. 
 
3. The Council should identify a dependable source of supplemental funding for the 
OEE to assure its continued viability. 
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4. Albuquerque should conduct mandatory audits of all participating candidate 
spending. Audits would reinforce the credibility of its program, perhaps recover 
unexpended funds and identify issues for future city oversight. 
 
5. The Council should amend “Form 5,” which citizens and candidates fill out to verify 
receipt of $5 qualifying contributions, to deter more directly any abuse or potential abuse 
in their gathering. 
 
6. Albuquerque should improve the City Clerk’s website to make campaign finance 
information more visible and accessible to site visitors. 
 
7. Albuquerque should require measure finance committees to state clearly the 
purpose of their spending – in support of or in opposition to a particular candidate or 
measure – in campaign finance disclosure reports. 
  
Albuquerque’s Open and Ethical Elections program has been measurably 
successful in its 2007 and 2009 election cycles. It has encouraged the election of 
independent, impartial and responsible candidates and assured the public that local 
government will operate with integrity. It has helped return to Albuquerque the political 
culture it seemingly lost when earlier popular restraints on electoral spending were set 
aside.  
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I.  HISTORY OF ALBUQUERQUE’S CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATIONS  
 The City of Albuquerque has for decades expressed deep concern over the 
distorting affects of money in its municipal elections. In 1974, voters passed Proposition 
2 by a 90% margin. It created "an election code for candidates" which strictly limited 
both contributions to and expenditures by municipal candidates.1 The law guided 
Albuquerque municipal elections until 1997, when a court temporarily enjoined the law’s 
spending limits following a legal challenge by a mayoral candidate.2 Under the 
challenged provision, candidates could not raise or spend an amount for a campaign 
based on the salary of the office being sought. Council candidates were limited to raising 
or spending an equivalent to the annual salary of a councilor; mayoral candidates were 
limited to raising or spending an equivalent to two times the annual salary of the mayor.3 
By 1999, the annual salary of the mayor was slightly over $87,000. In the years leading 
up to 2000, no incumbent mayor was reelected, in part because spending limitations 
negated the electoral advantage generally enjoyed by incumbent candidates.4    
                                                 
1The Albuquerque City Council ordered a special election held on February 26, 1974, including 5 proposals 
to amend the City Charter. Proposition 2, section 9, provided: "No candidate for elective office shall allow 
contributions or make expenditures in excess of the following: As to Councillors . . . , one year's salary as 
provided by this Charter; . . . As to the Mayor, two times one year's annual salary, as provided by this 
Charter." Also on the ballot: Proposition 1 created a code of ethics, and was adopted by a 90% margin; 
Proposition 3 drastically revised the city's election code instituting a mayor/council system of governance 
to replace one structured around a commission and city manager, and was adopted by a 79% margin; 
Proposition 4, to create at-large city council seats, and Proposition 5, to permit partisan municipal elections, 
were defeated, receiving 46.5% and 42.9% of the vote, respectively. See also New Mexico Common Cause, 
Out of Control: The Rise of Campaign Spending in Albuquerque Mayoral Campaigns (2005),  
http://www.commoncause.org/aft/cf/%7BFB3C1&E2-CDD1-4DF6-92BE-
BD4429893665%7D/OUTOFCONTROLMAYORALCAMPSPENDING.PDF ("Out of Control"). 
2
 The spending limits were invalidated by a state district judge but later reinstated following the stipulated 
dismissal of the suit. 
3
 Municipal elections in Albuquerque are held in odd-numbered years. The mayoral term is four years; 
council members also serve four-year terms, but their terms are staggered so that odd-numbered and even-
numbered districts are contested in different election cycles.  
4
 This was a finding of fact made by the District Court in its ruling to enjoin the spending limitation in 
Albuquerque’s City Charter. Homans v. City of Albuquerque, 217 F.Supp.2d 1197 (D.N.M. 2002). 
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A mayoral candidate successfully challenged, and the court enjoined,5 the spending limit 
prior to the municipal elections for mayor and city council in the fall of 2001. Campaign 
spending in that election increased significantly compared to the previous mayoral 
election in 1997. In February 2004, the United States Court of Appeal for the 10th Circuit 
denied an appeal to restore the spending limit.6  
Because Albuquerque citizens were accustomed to limited municipal campaign 
spending, the federal court’s decision to overturn the city’s spending limits together with 
the subsequent, dramatic increases in campaign spending created an environment that 
encouraged additional reforms.7 As State Senator Dede Feldman and former United 
States Senator Fred Harris wrote when the mayoral campaign heated up in 2005, 
“Albuquerque voters have shown disdain for the role big money plays in politics. Our 
now defunct spending limits, thrown out by the courts, were highly popular with 
Albuquerque residents; a 2001 poll showed that 74 percent of likely voters supported 
those mandatory limits on campaign spending.”8 These elected officials advocated 
“voluntary spending limits and low-cost public financing.”9   
                                                 
5
 After a series of hearings in Federal District Court and interlocutory appeal of that court’s denial of a 
preliminary injunction to the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, plaintiff Rick Homans was granted the 
preliminary injunction of the expenditure limits that he sought prior to the 2001 election. Homans v. City of 
Albuquerque, 264 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir.2001). The expenditure limits were permanently enjoined in Homans 
v. Albuquerque, 217 F. Supp. 1197 (D.N.M. 2002).  
6
 Homans v.City of Albuquerque, 336 F.3d 900, 908 (CA10 2004)(no “convincing evidence” that 
“expenditure limits are necessary to deter corruption.”) (emphasis in original). 
7
 On March 7, 2003, the City Council passed a “memorial” to support the enactment of “legislation by the 
New Mexico State Legislature to provide public financing of certain statewide political campaigns 
(positions on the Public Regulation Commission). Council Bill No. M-03-34. On March 13, 2003, the City 
Council passed a second memorial resolving that the new Albuquerque/Bernalillo County Government 
Charter “should include provisions for voluntary public financing of campaigns for local elective office. 
Council Bill No. M-03-37. http://cabq.legistar.com/legislation.aspx.  
8
 State Senator Dede Feldman and former U.S. Senator Fred Harris, “Return Campaigns to Voters,” 
Albuquerque Journal, June 18, 2005. 
9
 Id. 
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The City Council, reformers and others took action because they were concerned 
about the appearance of undue influence by large campaign contributors over elected 
officials as well as access by special interests to city hall decision makers.10 On June 30, 
2005, the Council submitted a charter amendment to the voters. The measure proposed 
providing “clean money” in the form of full public financing for municipal candidates in 
return for their pledge to limit their campaign spending and forego accepting any private 
contributions.  
In the months leading up to the October 4, 2005, election, Albuquerque voters 
watched candidate spending escalate to new heights. The incumbent mayor spent over 
$1.2 million in his re-election campaign. 
The previous mayoral election cycle in 2001 also saw a dramatic increase in 
spending by mayoral candidates. In 1997, seven candidates spent a combined total of 
about $486,000. In 2001, eight candidates combined spent more than $1.8 million, and a 
single candidate spent almost $552,000, more than the combined seven candidates in 
1997.11   
In 2005, however, spending by only four candidates mushroomed to more than 
$1.5 million.12 By the end of the campaign, the incumbent mayor spent over $1.2 million, 
more than twice the amount of the previous high spender. The mayor won re-election 
                                                 
10
 Former City Clerk Randy Autio recalled that concern grew about the “buying of the mayor by the 
developers, or at least the appearance that that was the case.” Interview with Randy Autio, former City 
Clerk, September 2010. Assistant City Attorney (Election Specialist) Robert Kidd recalled that civic 
motivation behind the enactment of the OEE was to counter the “perception that somehow successful 
candidates were those backed by the biggest corporations or donors.” Interview with Robert Kidd, 
Assistant City Attorney, August 2010. 
11
 Challenger Rick Homans had expenditures of over $551,000, according to data maintained by the City 
Clerk. www.cabq.gov/onlinesvcs/campaign.  
12
 Clerk of the City of Albuquerque, Campaign Reporting, www.cabq.gov/onlinesvcs/campaign.  See also 
Out of Control, pp. 1-3. 
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with 47% of the general election vote.13 Just over 41,000 votes were cast for him in that 
race, meaning that he spent over $29 for each vote he received. 
In the same 2005 election, Albuquerque voters overwhelmingly passed the Open 
and Ethical Elections (OEE) referendum, which created municipal public financing for 
city council and mayoral campaigns.14 The vote was a lopsided 69% to 31%. Voters, “fed 
up with the amount of private money flooding into New Mexico,”15 decisively continued 
their strong support for limited spending in municipal campaigns and declared their 
willingness to spend their tax dollars to achieve that goal. 
This report analyzes Albuquerque’s OEE to determine whether it has achieved its 
goals and suggests ways in which it might be improved. 
 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE OPEN AND ETHICAL ELECTIONS (OEE) 
PROGRAM 
 After losing its appeal in Homans v. City of Albuquerque, in 2004, the city looked 
for a different strategy to deter corruption and contain municipal election costs. The City 
Council proposed to voters that they adopt the Open and Ethical Elections program in the 
2005 municipal election. The measure's supporters explained that adoption of a public 
financing system for candidates in Albuquerque municipal elections would bring back 
many aspects of the political culture that had long been in place.  
                                                 
13
 Mayor Chavez defeated his nearest competitor by more than 21 percentage points. 
http://www.bernco.gov/upload/images/clerk/past_elections/city_2005_10.html. A run-off election is not 
held if one candidate receives 40% or more of the vote in the general election. Charter of the City of 
Albuquerque (hereinafter “Charter”), Art. II, Section 7. 
14
 Council Bill No. R-05-298, June 30, 2005, place a proposed amendment to the City Charter on the 
October 4, 2005, ballot to provide for public campaign financing in municipal elections. (enactment #: R-
2005-105).  http://cabq.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=248749&GUID=F0780E5B-FBEF-4EAA-
ADC3-96084DA003AB&Options=ID|Text|&Search=Open+and+Ethical+Elections.  
15
 Interview with Steve Allen, executive director of New Mexico Common Cause, September 2010. 
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Voters approved the proposal in October of 2005, just 20 months following the 10th 
Circuit ruling.  
The OEE included several goals to: 
• Avoid actual or apparent undue influence or corruption of municipal office 
holders by large campaign donors. 
• Strengthen public confidence in governmental and election processes. 
• Provide qualified candidates with adequate funding to run competitive campaigns 
for election and thereby provide increased choices to city residents in the 
leadership and direction of the city. 
• Increase accountability of elected municipal officials to constituents, rather than 
contributors. 
• Insure a fair, responsible and ethical municipal election process. 
Since adoption of the OEE in 2005, the city has conducted two municipal 
elections during which candidates could seek public financing for their campaigns. The 
first elections conducted under the program in 2007 were for city council seats, and 
mayoral candidates were first able to seek public funding in the 2009 city elections.  
 
III. HOW THE OEE WORKS 
 The Open and Ethical Elections law requires the City Clerk to adopt rules to 
implement the new program.16 Specifically, the clerk has ongoing responsibility to 
determine candidate qualifications; certify participation; disperse city funds to 
                                                 
16
 Charter, Art. XVI, Section 19. 
10 
candidates; collect qualifying contributions and other revenues; assure return of unspent 
disbursements; and provide public education about the OEE. 
A. Program Funding 
The referendum approved by Albuquerque voters established a specific fund (“the 
Fund”) for the money to be paid to municipal candidates through the program. The city 
budgets one-tenth of one percent of its General Fund to provide resources for the Fund, as 
mandated by the city charter.17 Additionally, money for the program is “deposited 
directly to the Fund” when received from the following sources: 
• Public contributions directly to the public campaign program.18  
• Unspent qualifying funds raised by candidates seeking public funding of 
their campaigns.  
• Excess qualifying funds as defined by the program.  
• Unspent amounts by candidates who withdraw from or become ineligible 
to participate in the program.  
• Unspent amounts by participating candidates at the conclusion of a 
municipal campaign.  
• Additional amounts appropriated by the City Council based on the 
recommendation of the City Clerk or the City Attorney.19 
 
 
                                                 
17
 Charter, Art. XVI, Section 10 (D). “One-tenth of 1% of the approved General Fund (Fund 110) 
appropriation shall be reserved in the Fund to fund Participating Candidates . . . as provided in the Open 
and Ethical Elections Code.” For FY 2011 the amount budgeted for the OEE is $421,000, not including 
$34,000 for indirect overhead. City of Albuquerque FY/11 Approved Budget, Volume One: Financial Plan, 
www.cabq.gov/budget/fy2011approved/FY11_Financial_Documents.pdf 
18
 Id., Section 10 (E). 
19
 Id., Section 10 (C). 
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B. Candidate Participation 
 Candidates running in city elections can voluntarily opt into the program if they 
are able to qualify under its rules, or they may choose to finance their campaigns through 
private contributions. Candidates who wish to participate in the public funding program 
are required to raise qualifying contributions to demonstrate their viability.20  They are 
permitted to raise seed money “for the primary purpose of enabling the applicant 
candidate to collect qualifying contributions and petition signatures.”21 If they are 
certified as qualifying, they receive lump sum grants. When they agree to accept the 
public funds, candidates must also agree to limit their expenditures22 and forego spending 
any other money on their campaign – either their own funds or private contributions. 
Additional supplemental funds are also available to address high spending by 
nonparticipating opponents and independent groups.  
C. Candidate Certification  
In order to be placed on the ballot as a participating candidate, individuals seeking 
to be certified must raise qualifying contributions and, as do all candidates seeking a 
place on the ballot, gather petition signatures. The law requires the gathering of 
qualifying contributions by candidates who seek public funding to ensure that candidates 
prove themselves viable contenders before receiving any public funds. Candidates are 
                                                 
20
 Charter, Art. II, Section 4. In addition to collecting qualifying contributions, OEE participants must, as 
do privately financed candidates, qualify for the ballot by obtaining the signatures of citizens: 3,000 
petition signatures are required of candidates for mayor and 500 petition signatures are required of 
candidates for the City Council.  
21
 Charter, Art. XVI, Section 3 (R). Seed money may be raised in contributions of no greater than $100 per 
person. A candidate, however, may contribute up to $500 for his or her campaign. The aggregate amount of 
seed money may not exceed 10% of the applicable spending limit, an amount calculated by the Clerk of the 
City of Albuquerque. 
22
 Regulations of the Albuquerque City Clerk for the Open and Ethical Elections Code (hereinafter 
“Regulations”), Part A. Expenditures are limited to “an amount that is equal to the amount of revenue 
distributed to the Participating Candidate from the Fund . . .”  
12 
additionally permitted to raise seed money to fund the collection of qualifying 
contributions and petition signatures. Detailed reports about the candidates’ progress in 
this process are required to be filed with the City Clerk.23 After candidates file 
declarations of intent to seek public funding, they obtain receipt books to record the $5 
contributions they gather and nominating petitions to be signed by a specified number of 
registered voters. Subsequent to being certified as a participating candidate, the law 
requires candidates seeking public funding to comply with contribution and expenditure 
reporting, exactly the same as nonparticipating candidates, including reporting of in-kind 
contributions received. 24 
1. Seed Money 
During a preliminary period of time, candidates can “explore” the possibility of 
running for office and can seek “seed” money with which to attempt to qualify for the 
program by later collecting sufficient qualifying contributions and petition signatures. 
Seed money is defined as cumulative contributions of no more than $100 per person and 
$500 of the candidate’s own money.25 This “exploratory period” runs between January 1st 
and February 15th of an election year for mayoral candidates and between March 15th and 
May 31st for city council candidates. Seed money may not be used for retiring a previous 
                                                 
23
 Regulations, Part C (3) and (4). For 2009 mayoral candidates, on each Friday of the qualifying period 
after March 1, candidates were required to report their qualifying contributions by turning in the 
contributions and the receipts that verify the contributions to the clerk. For 2009 council candidates, the 
contributions and receipts were due on each Friday of the qualifying period beginning May 15.  
24
 Charter, Art. XVI, Section 9. Participating candidates file campaign finance disclosure reports pursuant 
to the Election Code, as does any municipal candidate, whether publically or privately financed. See also 
Regulations, Part D (1). 
25
 Regulations, Part B (6) (a) and (b). Two special reports are required of candidates who seek public 
funding. The first occurs before the collection of any qualifying contributions and includes information on 
seed money and in-kind contributions. It is filed at the same time a candidate files with the clerk a 
declaration of intent to seek public funding. The second disclosure report is required at the time the final 
report of qualifying contributions is due (April 1 for mayoral candidates and June 1 for council candidates, 
or the next city working day). 
13 
campaign debt; the regulations specify that public money “may only be used for the 
current campaign.”26 
The total amount raised for seed money cannot exceed 10% of the maximum 
grant available for a candidate running for a particular office. The clerk provides 
estimates of the applicable spending limit for candidates seeking public funding at the 
beginning of the exploratory period. Any seed money raised in excess of 10% of  that 
amount is deducted from the amount of the grant.27  For example, maximum council 
grants have ranged from about $27,000 to just over $42,000, so that amounts exceeding 
roughly $2,700 to $4,200 would be deducted from a candidate’s grant. In-kind 
contributions, each having a value “not to exceed 5% of the annual salary” of the office 
being sought, may also be accepted, so long as, in the aggregate, in-kind contributions do 
not exceed 10% of the applicable spending limit.28 
2. Qualifying Contributions 
Following the exploratory period, there is a “qualifying period” that runs between 
February 16th and March 31st for mayoral candidates and between May 1st and May 31st 
for city council candidates, during which seed money may be spent to pay for initial 
campaign costs associated with the collection of specific “qualifying” $5 contributions 
and citizen petition signatures. Candidates for City Council must collect individual $5 
contributions from one percent of the voters registered in the district in which they seek 
to run; candidates for Mayor must collect them from one percent of all voters registered 
                                                 
26
 Regulations, Part B (3). 
27
 Charter, Art. XVI, Section 6 (C) “Seed money that exceeds 10% of the applicable distribution to a 
Participating Candidate shall be deducted from the revenues distributed to the Applicant Candidate from 
the Fund.” See also Regulations, Part B (4). 
28
 Id., Section 3 (K). In-kind contributions do not include the value of personal services volunteered by 
individuals. 
14 
in Albuquerque. In 2009, for example, mayoral candidates were required to raise such 
contributions from over 3,200 voters. During the qualifying period, a candidate may 
continue to raise seed money, so long as he or she has not exceeded the “10% of the 
maximum grant” limit noted above. 
3. Petition Signatures 
During these two fundraising periods, all candidates, whether or not they seek 
public funding for their campaigns, are required to obtain the signatures of two percent of 
the voters in the district in which they seek to run. Candidates running for mayor must 
obtain more than 6,500 signatures.  
D. Additional Limitations on Candidates 
Once a candidate is certified to receive a grant of public funds to finance his or 
her campaign, the program specifically prohibits certain uses of that public money. Thus, 
no public funding is permitted to be used as a contribution to another candidate, political 
committee or measure, or be used in any race – other than the one in which a publically-
funded candidate is running. Candidates may not pay off loans, debts or campaign 
penalties using public funds. 29   
The program restricts any personal use of public funds. Candidates may not fund 
out-of-state travel, purchase household items or supplies, make mortgage or rent 
payments on personal residences, purchase event tickets unless attendance is part of a 
campaign function, or pay dues or other fees at clubs of any sort unless the cost is part of 
a specific event. 30 Candidates are permitted to purchase clothing using the public funds, 
                                                 
29
 Id., Section 8. 
30
 Id. 
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but only that which “has a campaign message as part of the clothing or is used as a 
uniform for campaign staff and/or volunteers.”31  
Salaries may only be paid using public funds to individuals who provide bona fide 
services to the campaign. This bona fide standard also applies to the services of political 
consultants. 
E. Reporting Requirements for Candidates Seeking Public Funding 
Candidates who seek public funding must file, prior to seeking any $5 qualifying 
contributions, a Declaration of Intent to obtain public financing. In the declaration, 
candidates agree to comply with the regulations for the program and not use any funds 
received under the Fund to retire a previous campaign debt.32 Candidates who seek public 
funding also submit two more special disclosure reports to the city clerk.33 
1. Disclosure Reports 
Campaign-related contributions made to and expenditures made by all municipal 
candidates, publicly funded or not, are monitored through six mandatory pre-election 
reports to the city clerk.34 Two additional disclosure reports, however, due several weeks 
prior to the campaign finance reports from every candidate, are made only by candidates 
                                                 
31
 Regulations, Part E. 
32
 Id., Form 1. 
33
 Id., Part C (4). 
34
 Charter, Art. XIII, Section 4 (c) (2). Information in these reports determines the availability of matching 
funds-opposing funds to candidates participating in the Fund. The reports are due as follows:  
 First report Friday of the12th week preceding the election 
 Second report Friday of the 8th week preceding the election 
 Third report Friday of the 4th week preceding the election 
 Fourth report Friday of the 2nd week preceding the election 
 Fifth report Friday of the week preceding the election 
 Sixth report Monday immediately preceding the election 
Two other reports are due from candidates and measure finance committees following the election. One 
must be filed by the 7th day following the election; the other may be filed no sooner than 7 days or later 
than 45 days following the election. 
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who seek public funding. In the event a runoff election is necessary, publically-funded 
candidates must file additional mandatory disclosure reports.35 
The first of the two initial reports required of publicly-funded candidates is made 
during the qualifying period, prior to collection of any qualifying contributions, at the 
same time candidates submit their “Declaration of Intent.” This first disclosure report and 
the Declaration of Intent must be filed no later than March 31 for mayoral candidates and 
May 31 for city council candidates.36 It must list all contributors of seed money, 
including name, address, occupation and employer (including the employer’s address), 
expenditures of seed money and the details of all in-kind contributions, including 
identification of the contributor and a description of the contribution.37  
The second disclosure report required of those candidates seeking public financing 
occurs at the end of the qualifying period and requires further disclosure of seed money 
and in-kind contributions and expenditures. It is filed at the same time as the final 
Qualifying Contribution report is due (see below).  
2. Qualifying Contributions Reports 
The Qualifying Contributions report is required to include, for each qualifying $5 
contribution: 
• The date the qualifying contribution was received, which must be within 
the qualifying period. 
                                                 
35
 Regulations, Part B (6) (f).  
 First report Friday of the 4th week preceding the runoff election 
 Second report Friday immediately preceding the runoff election 
 Third report Monday immediately preceding the runoff election 
 Fourth report The 7th day following the runoff election 
 Fifth report No sooner than 7 days or later than 45 days following the runoff election. 
36
 Regulations, Part C (1). 
37
 Regulations, Part B (7).  
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• The name and residential address of the contributor, which must match 
that contained on the voter registration rolls and which address must be 
within the district for the office sought by the candidate. 
• Copies of receipts issued to each contributor, signed by the contributor and 
the candidate (which are intended to verify that the contributor knowingly 
contributed his or her own money for the purpose of qualifying the 
candidate for public funding, and that the qualifying contributions each are 
made with the knowledge of the candidate). 
The report is initially due from candidates on each Friday of the qualifying period 
following March 1.38 The final Qualifying Contributions report is due at noon on the 
work day immediately following the expiration of the qualifying period: April 1 for 
mayoral applicants and June 1 for City Council applicants.39 
F. Funding Distribution 
Two days following the certification of those candidates who have met the 
requirements of the program, the city clerk is required to make the first distribution of 
funds from the Fund.40 Candidates receive $1 per each registered voter in the district in 
which he or she seeks election (either a particular city council district in the case of city 
council candidates, or the entire city in the case of mayoral candidates). The amount of 
seed money and qualifying contributions for each candidate are deducted from his or her 
                                                 
38
 Regulations, Part C (4). 
39
 Regulations, Part B (6). 
40
 Charter, Art. XVI, Section 14 (A). 
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grant amount.41 Distributions are specifically subject to the availability of resources in the 
Fund.42 
Candidates who are running unopposed are not eligible to receive grants from the 
Fund following notice from the city clerk that they are unopposed.43 
G.  Matching Funds 
The program additionally distributes supplemental matching funds to participating 
candidates when funds spent in opposition by a nonparticipating candidate “exceed the 
distribution from the Fund plus any seed money spent.”44 These so-called "Opposing 
Funds" are paid to participating candidates “as soon as possible after the first, second and 
third campaign finance disclosure reports are due . . . .”45 Amounts are calculated based 
on spending by a nonparticipating opponent or a measure finance committee46 that makes 
expenditures in an electioneering ad or mailer that specifies a participating candidate by 
name or title.47 
H. Run-off Elections 
Albuquerque elections in which no candidate garners more than 40% of the vote 
require a mandatory run-off election.48 Publically-funded candidates who participate in 
run-off elections receive an additional $0.33 per registered voter in the district in which 
                                                 
41
 Id., Section 12 (C). 
42
 Id., Section 14 (B). 
43
 Regulations, Part H (10). 
44
 Charter, Art. XVI, Section 16. These funds, too, are subject to the availability of resources.  
45
 Regulations, Part H (9) (a).  
46
 A measure finance committee is defined as a political committee that works in support of or in opposition 
to a candidate, or which supports or opposes ballot measures. A group making independent expenditures is 
not subject to a spending limit. A group coordinating its expenditures with a candidate is permitted to make 
a certain amount of expenditures, which are treated as in-kind contributions, Id., Part F (1), the aggregate 
amount of which is not to exceed 10% of the applicable spending limit. For mayoral candidates that amount 
is about $5,000. Id., Part H (6). 
47
 Id., Part H (9) (c). 
48
 Charter, Art. II, Section 8 (a). 
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the run-off election will occur (as opposed to $1 per voter in the regular municipal 
election).49 
I. Treatment of Grants to Candidates Who Withdraw 
A candidate is permitted to withdraw from OEE following his or her certification 
as a participating candidate and continue the campaign as a nonparticipating candidate, 
but he or she must do so by filing a written statement with the city clerk and return “an 
amount of money equal to all monies distributed to the candidate from the Fund plus 
interest at the rate of twelve percent per annum.”50 If a participating candidate withdraws 
entirely from the race, he or she “shall immediately return any amount to the Fund that is 
unspent . . .”51 
J. Return of Unexpended, Unencumbered Grant Monies 
The public financing scheme adopted in Albuquerque contemplates the return of 
unexpended funds by candidates within two weeks after the regular municipal election.52 
In two election cycles since the OEE was adopted only one candidate has returned excess 
funds to the city.53 
K. Enforcement 
The Board of Ethics and Campaign Practices currently has the power to enforce 
the Open and Ethical Elections Code.54 Prior to the October 6, 2009, election the City 
Attorney was responsible for enforcement and violations of the OEE but was only able to 
                                                 
49
 Charter, Art. XVI, Section 15.  
50
 Regulations, Part G (2).  
51
 Id., Part G (5). Candidate Feroza Jussawalla withdrew from the District 6 race in 2007, as noted below in 
Table 1 on page 22. 
52
 Charter, Art. XVI, Section 8 (C); Id., Section 10 (C). 
53
 Interview with City Clerk Amy Bailey, August 2010. Candidate Benton returned unspent funds following 
the District 3 race in 2009, as noted on Table 3 on page 27. 
54
 Charter, Art. XVI, Section 21 (amended by Proposition 6 on the ballot in the municipal election, October 
6, 2009). 
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bring criminal penalties. The thrust of the voter-approved charter amendment in 2009 
was that most violations of the OEE should be treated as civil, rather than a criminal, 
matters. There has been only one instance in which an enforcement action was 
undertaken. Robert Kidd, an Assistant City Attorney, reported that a 2007 city council 
candidate was found to have overspent. Before any criminal action was initiated by the 
City Attorney, however, the candidate readily admitted the error and settled with the city 
for a fine of about $500. According to Mr. Kidd, “The process was rather informal.” 55 
 
IV. ANALYSIS  
The Open and Ethical Elections (OEE) program has been in place for two election 
cycles: 2007 and 2009.   
The first municipal candidates eligible to receive public funding through the OEE 
ran for city council in 2007, when even-numbered city council seats (Districts 2, 4, 6, and 
8) were contested. In 2009, the office of mayor and the odd-numbered city council seats 
(Districts 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9) were contested. 
Of the ten current incumbent elected municipal officials in Albuquerque, eight 
won their seats using public funding for their campaigns. Their eight campaigns spent a 
combined total of just over $512,000, which is less than one half of the more than $1.2 
million spent by one mayoral candidate in 2005. In fact, the entire bill for the OEE over 
the 2007 and 2009 election cycles was just over $1.2 million, which represents about 
76% of the total amount mandated (one-tenth of one percent of the city's General Fund) 
for the OEE for those two elections. Thirteen candidates were fully funded. 
                                                 
55
 Interview with Assistant City Attorney Kidd, September 2010. 
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Interestingly, since implementation of the public funding program, there have 
been no run-off elections in municipal races, even in aggressively-contested, multi-
candidate races and open seat races.  
A. The 2007 City Council Election 
In 2007, ten candidates ran for four city council seats. Six of them qualified for 
public funding, although one withdrew before Election Day. Of the five remaining 
publically-financed candidates, two were victorious: incumbent Debbie O’Malley in 
District 2 and newcomer Rey Garduno in District 6. O’Malley was an incumbent 
progressive who supported adoption of the OEE and garnered 72% of the vote. Garduno, 
a newcomer to elective politics, won 49% of the vote in a four-way open seat race. 
Turnout on Election Day was just over 10%. 
To be certified by the city clerk as a qualified candidate, each candidate seeking 
public financing was required to raise contributions from one percent of registered voters 
in the particular district in which he or she ran. The number of these qualifying 
contributions varied, because the districts themselves did not contain equal numbers of 
registered voters. The number ranged from 253 contributions ($1,264 in $5 per voter 
increments) to 383 contributions ($1,913 in $5 increments). 
The five grants to candidates made from the Fund in 2007 ranged between 
$24,000 and $32,000. The total grant amount distributed by the city was about $139,700, 
even though the city’s budget had allocated more than $480,000 to the Fund. 
Supplemental matching funds, called Opposing Funds, were available at an amount of not 
more than two times the original amount received by any candidate. Only one candidate 
received additional funds – just over $1,600 – based on the spending of opponents, but 
22 
the funds were released to that participating candidate too late in the campaign to be 
utilized effectively.56 
 
Table 1 
 
Open and Ethical Election Participant Grants and Spending, 2007 
 
        In-Kind 
    Grant  Seed Money Contribution Expenditures 
 
Dist. 2  Debbie O’Malley (I)* $  29,820 $   4,709  $  2,034  $   31,299 
          1,63857 
 
Dist. 4 Paulette de’Pascal $  31,692 $   3,270    $   36,167 
 
Dist. 6 Rey Garduno*  $  25,903 $   1,278    $   25,439 
 Kevin Wilson  $  26,720 $      460  $     500  $   26,628 
 Joan Griffin  $  24,140 $   3,400  $  2,771  $   26,786 
 Feroza Jussawalla $  26,295 $      885    $     2,655 
 
Total Dispersed   $166,208 
 
Returned to Fund58  $  26,520 
 
Total OEE Funds Expended $139,688 
 
(I) incumbent 
* elected 
 
 
Councilor O’Malley later compared her first electoral campaign in 2003 to her 
publically-funded campaign in 2007. She noted that in 2003: 
 “A great deal of time was spent fundraising. I spent every morning for a month or 
so calling people and asking for money.” She continued, “Industry [was] putting lots of 
money in campaigns to get their candidates elected. That was the first time such 
contributions had appeared in council races. Because there was no spending cap, it 
                                                 
56
 Interview with Councilor Debbie O’Malley, August 2010. 
57
 Opposing Funds grant. 
58
 Ms. Jussawalla withdrew from the race after the first reporting period; she returned the grant, less 
expenditures plus interest of $225, to the Fund. 
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[raising money and planning expenditures] was flexible. I could strategize and call on my 
district network. But many other candidates couldn’t even get in the race.”  
In the 2007 race, O’Malley admitted that the spending limit “was a downside.” 
On the other hand, she continued, “with the [OEE] program, you do a lot more outreach 
and the voters have a lot more ownership of the election process, because many of them 
have given $5 to help get a candidate qualified.”59 She stated that she did not believe the 
requirements for qualification as a council candidate were too daunting. 
 
 
Table 2 
 
Cost Per Vote for All Candidates, 200760 
 
Office  Candidate  Votes Received Expenditures Cost Per Vote 
 
Dist. 2  Debbie O’Malley (I)*   3,229 (72%)  $   35,222       $10.91 
  Katherine Martinez   1,235 (28%)  $   38,280       $31.00 
 
Dist. 4  Brad Winter (I)*          3,086 (81%)  $   26,289              $  8.52 
  Paulette de’Pascale          707 (19%)              $   36,167              $51.16 
 
Dist. 6  Rey Garduno*    1,957 (49%)     $   25,439              $13.00 
  Kevin Wilson       906 (23%)  $   26,628              $29.39 
  Joan Griffin                     799 (20%)  $   26,786              $33.52 
  Blair Kaufman      344 ( 9%)               $     4,255              $12.37 
 
Dist. 8  Trudy Jones*     2,538 (100%) $   32,337       $12.74 
 
 
 (I) incumbent 
 * elected 
 Italicized name indicates candidate was privately financed 
 
 
                                                 
59
 Interview with Councilor O’Malley, August 2010. 
60
 The expenditure amount for candidates does not include spending reported during the qualifying period. 
It includes campaign spending reported beginning on July 13, 2007. 
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 The 2007 participating candidates were bound by expenditure limits, because they 
agreed to accept public financing from the city. Their privately-financed opponents did 
not have to limit their spending. Table 2 above shows that the spending of privately-
funded candidates was not out of line with the spending of the publically-funded 
candidates, perhaps because public expectation supported the spending limits imposed by 
the OEE. The two candidates who were incumbents spent less than their opponents, 
whether or not they participated in the OEE. Two of the four publicly financed candidates 
prevailed, and privately financed candidate was unopposed. 
The 2007 election was for many purposes the dress rehearsal for the mayoral race, 
which took take place two years later. Most observers believe that the city got through the 
2007 election well.61  
Following the 2007 election, the city council refined the OEE to assure that it 
would operate smoothly on the larger, city-wide stage. 
The city council changed the campaign finance reporting regulations to improve 
the effectiveness of the supplemental matching funds provision. Instead of only six 
reporting dates, with four of them prior to Election Day,62 the council settled on eight 
reporting dates. It increased to six the number of pre-election reports and added reports 
                                                 
61
 Interview with City Clerk Autio, September 2010; interview with Assistant City Attorney Kidd, 
September 2010, and New Mexico Common Cause,  Returning Elections to Voters, Albuquerque’s Success 
with Voluntary Public Financing of Campaigns (2007) http://www.commoncause.org/atf/cf/%7Bfb3c17e2-
cdd1-4df6-92be-bd4429893665%7D/RETURNING%20ELECTIONS%20TO%20VOTERS.PDF.  
62
 For the 2007 election, campaign finance reports were required of all candidates and measure finance 
committees according to the following schedule: 
 First Report Friday of the 12th week preceding the election 
 Second Report Friday of the 4th week preceding the election 
 Third Report Friday of the week preceding the election 
 Fourth Report Monday immediately preceding the election 
Two other reports were due from candidates and measure finance committees following the election. One 
was due the 7th day following Election Day; the other was due the 45th day after Election Day. 
Office of the City Clerk, 2007 Election Guide, 
http://www.cabq.gov/clerk/documents/2007%20Election%20guide%20May%2029%202007.pdf/view. 
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due the eighth and second weeks preceding the election. This was intended to assure that 
spending that might trigger Opposing Funds to a publically-funded candidate could be 
calculated and public funds dispersed in time for the candidate to make effective use of 
them.63  
Also, voters in 2009 approved various charter amendments, including one 
intended to depoliticize the office of the city clerk by making it more independent of the 
mayor and the council. 64 The new provision added by Proposition 3, which passed with 
66% of the vote, requires an “open and competitive hiring process conducted by the 
Mayor with the advice and consent of two-thirds of . . . the Council,” and it specifies that 
the clerk’s term coincide with the mayor’s unless the clerk is removed for cause.65 
B. The 2009 Mayoral and City Council Elections 
Many observers believed that the October 6, 2009, municipal elections in 
Albuquerque would determine the future of public funding in the city. The mayoral 
election in 2009 offers a textbook example of the value of public funding in democratic 
elections. The OEE is on solid ground. 
The election was a success for many reasons, not the least of which was that the 
vigorous campaign for mayor attracted several credible candidates during the qualifying 
period, and each of the three candidates ultimately on the ballot was certified to run their 
campaigns with full public funding. Every one of the five winning city council candidates 
opted-in to the OEE, including two who were not incumbents. Residents noticed a 
                                                 
63On December 8, 2008, the City Council passed an ordinance amending Article XIII, sections 2 and 4, of 
the Elections Code, including a provision to increase required reporting by candidates and measure finance 
committees. File # O-08-52 (Enactment # O-2008-44). http://cabq.legistar.com/legislation.aspx.    
64
 Interview with Councilor O’Malley, August 2010.  
65
 Charter, Art. V, Section 4 (e). 
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difference in the method of campaigning on the part of all the candidates. “The campaign 
consisted more of retail politics – meet and greets, mailers, town hall meetings with 
groups of voters, radio spots – more like local political campaigns should look like.”66 
Albuquerque citizens experienced a lively mayoral campaign that focused more on 
important local issues and voter contact and less on special interest issues and aggressive 
media campaigns that were the focus of the preceding two elections in 2001 and 2005. “I 
think the candidates [. . .] stayed on the issues by and large,” commented political 
scientist Timothy Krebs.67 
There were no violations of the expenditure limits to which the candidates had 
agreed. The grants made to candidates were adequate to assure competitive campaigns. 
Most of the publically-funded candidates had more money to spend than their privately-
funded opponents.  
In a hotly-contested three-way race for mayor and in five city council districts 
(three of which featured contested races), the voters were presented with important 
issues. Independent expenditures were minimal and of little consequence to the 
campaigns of the publically-funded candidates. Supplemental matching funds were not 
triggered in any race. Turnout on Election Day was 25%, up from 10% in 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
66
 Interview with Matt Brix, policy director of the Center for Civic Policy, September 2010. 
67
 Timothy Krebs, professor of political science, University of New Mexico, quoted by Dan McKay, 
“Mayoral Race Down to the Wire,” Albuquerque Journal, October 4, 2009. 
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Table 3 
 
Open and Ethical Election Participant Grants and Spending, 2009 
 
        In-Kind 
    Grant  Seed Money Contribution Expenditures 
 
Mayor Richard Berry*  $319,220 $28,651  $  28,651 $308,935 
 Martin Chavez (I) $328,680   $  31,309 $328,814 
 Richard Romero  $297,934 $34,280  $  22,878 $331,153 
 
Subtotal   $945,834                 $968,902  
 
 
Dist. 1 Ken Sanchez (I)*  $  35,577   $        939 $    8,770 
 
Dist. 3  Isaac Benton (I)*  $  29,424 $    2,930 $        200 $  29,197 
 
Dist. 5 Dan Lewis*  $  42,482 $    4,988 $      4,687 $  41,583 
 
Dist. 7 Michael Cook*  $  36,450     $       925 $         316 $  31,163 
 
Dist. 9 Don Harris (I)*  $  32,811 $         20 $         987 $  32,822 
 
Subtotal   $176,744     $145,535 
 
Total Dispersed              $1,122,578 
 
Returned to Fund68   $  28,508 
 
Total OEE Funds Expended       $1,094,070   
 
 (I) incumbent  
 * elected 
 
  
The city had approved a budget of $1.17 million for the Fund in fiscal year 2009. 
This proved sufficient, although there was concern that there would be so many 
candidates that the city would not be able to fund them all.69 The city clerk for the 2009 
election, Randy Autio, noted, “There was not a single Ethics Board challenge in the 2009 
                                                 
68
 District 1 candidate Sanchez was unopposed and, pursuant to Section 10 of the regulations, returned 
$26,807 to the fund at the time of the Third campaign finance report (September 11, 2009). District 3 
candidate Benton had unspent funds following the election and, pursuant to the Charter, Art. XVI, Section 
8 (C), returned $1,701 to the fund at the time of the Eighth campaign finance report (November 20, 2009). 
69
 Interview with Councilor O’Malley. August 2010. See also Dan McKay, “City May Lack Money to Fund 
’09 Campaigns,” Albuquerque Journal, November 11, 2008, and “Obtaining Public Money is 
‘Painstaking,’” Albuquerque Journal, March 23. 2009.  
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campaign. It was one of the cleanest elections that I could have hoped for.”70 Steve Allen, 
executive director of New Mexico Common Cause, remarked about the election, “The 
system worked great in both elections. Albuquerque’s approach to campaign financing 
encouraged candidate participation in the program and was very attractive to them. The 
voters won; it was money well spent.”71  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
70
 Interview with City Clerk Autio, September 2010. 
71
 Interview with Steve Allen, New Mexico Common Cause, September 2010. 
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Table 4 
Cost Per Vote for All Candidates, 200972 
 
Office  Candidate  Votes Received Expenditures Cost Per Vote 
 
Mayor  Richard Berry* 36,466 (44%)  $308,935       $  8.47 
 
  Martin Chavez (I) 29,140 (35%)  $328,814       $11.28 
 
  Richard Romero 17,458 (21%)  $331,153       $18.97 
 
Dist. 1  Ken Sanchez (I)*   5,322 (100%) $    8,770       $  1.65 
 
Dist. 3  Isaac Benton (I)*   3,598 (59%)  $   29,197              $  8.11 
  Alan Armijo    2,462 (41%)  $   30,697              $12.47 
 
Dist.  5 Dan Lewis*    6,229 (56%)  $   41,583              $  6.68 
  Michael Cadigan (I)   4,898 (44%)  $   26,617       $  5.43 
 
Dist. 7  Michael Cook*   7,795 (96%)  $   31,163       $  4.00 
  David Green (w/i)      351 (4%)              21              $    .06 
 
Dist. 9  Don Harris (I)*   6,392 (79%)   $   32,822              $  5.13 
  David Barbour   1,677 (21%)  $     3,620       $  2.16 
 
 
 (I) incumbent 
 (w/i) write-in candidate 
* elected 
Italicized name indicates candidate was privately financed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
72
 The expenditure amount for candidates does not include spending reported during the qualifying period. 
It includes spending reported beginning July 17, 2009. 
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1. The Mayoral Race  
 In 2007, the voters approved a ban on contributions to candidates from business 
entities or individuals in contractual relationships with the City.73 This legislation became 
a game changer for, although business entities and city contractors were still permitted to 
contribute to measure finance committees (local, non-candidate political committees), 
candidates could no longer look to them as sources of contributions. The OEE thus 
became more attractive to the candidates than traditional fundraising, “because obviously 
one of the easier ways to raise money is through business entities,” observed Clerk 
Autio.74 Candidates who were not independently wealthy may have opted to campaign 
with public funds rather than risk being unable to compete if they could not raise enough 
money from individual contributors or unions. 
 Three candidates remained in the mayoral race late in March and all three 
qualified for OEE grants. They adopted significantly different strategies in spending their 
OEE grants. Incumbent Mayor Martin Chavez saved about 60% of his money for the last 
four weeks of the campaign; up to that stage of the election he reported expenditures of 
just over $128,000. State Senator Richard Romero spent the most of any of the mayoral 
candidates in the early stages of the campaign -- $227,000 – which was more than 75% of 
his grant. Richard Berry, the State Representative who won the race, spent just over half 
of his grant – $174,000 – saving over 40% of his grant for the last four weeks of the 
                                                 
73
 The ban was approved by voters 72% to 28% in Proposition 2 in the 2007 municipal election, which 
amended the City Charter, Art. XIII, Section 4, by adding a new subsection (f). The ban states: “No 
candidate shall accept a contribution in support of the candidate’s campaign from any corporation, limited 
liability company, firm, partnership, joint stock company or similar business entity. No candidate shall 
accept a contribution in support of the candidate’s campaign from any person, other than a City employee, 
who at the time of the contribution is in a contractual relationship with the City to provide goods or services 
to the City.” 
74
 Marjorie Childress, “New Campaign Finance Rules Will Shape ABQ Mayor’s Race,” New Mexico 
Independent, February 9, 2009. 
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campaign. In contrast, at the same point of the 2005 mayoral race, Chavez had reported 
expenditures of more than $700,000. 
Ultimately, challenger Berry defeated incumbent Chavez by nine percentage 
points and avoided a run-off election by garnering 44% of the vote. The third candidate, 
Richard Romero, former Democratic leader of the New Mexico Senate, received 21% of 
the vote. All three candidates were well known to Albuquerque voters before the mayoral 
race began.  
Two early mayoral hopefuls were city council members whose familiarity with 
voters generally ended at the edge of their districts. Council incumbents M. Debbie 
O’Malley and Michael Cadigan left the mayoral race in the spring of 2009, because they 
anticipated being unable to raise the required number of qualifying contributions.75 They 
stated that the problem was not the required 3,200 contributions but the too brief time -- 
six weeks -- in which to collect them. Cadigan noted that the process was time consuming 
and difficult. He said, “Not only do people often not have cash or checkbooks on them 
these days, but many also don’t know the system so you have to spend a lot of time with 
them.”76 Both he and Councilor O’Malley suggested that the short period of time gave a 
built-in advantage to candidates who had ready city-wide networks to assist them with 
the task, and they advocated an extension of the period to collect the contributions by 
four to six weeks. They argued that such a change would not compromise the integrity of 
the OEE. It would merely provide interested candidates sufficient time to participate, thus 
allowing voters more choices in the voting booth on Election Day.77 
 
                                                 
75
 Cadigan opted to seek reelection to his city council seat, a race he lost. 
76
 Marjorie Childress, Blog entry, New Mexico Independent, March 16, 2009.  
77
 Interview with Councilor O’Malley, August 2010.  
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2. The City Council Races 
The five 2009 city council district races each included a candidate who qualified 
for public funds. Three of those candidates were incumbents, who won handily. Indeed, 
one of them, Ken Sanchez, was uncontested in the District 1 race. Incumbent Councilor 
Isaac Benton of District 3 later commented that “there was a big difference [running as a 
participating candidate].  Not having to fundraise—I had more time to focus on the 
issues.”  He continued, “I do not like asking for large contributions and as a publicly-
financed candidate, I did well, so I would opt-in again.”78 He won by 18 percentage 
points and spent $4,500 less on the 2009 campaign than he had in 2005. The other 
incumbent, Don Harris in District 9, won by 58 percentage points and spent about 
$33,000. In 2005, Harris prevailed after spending nearly $89,000, of which $65,000 was 
spent on a run-off election. 
The fourth OEE participant, conservative businessman Dan Lewis, upset 
incumbent Michael Cadigan by 16 percentage points. Even though new to electoral 
politics, Lewis did not believe the qualification requirements for the OEE were too steep. 
He called those requirements “a good balance and part of the vetting process. A candidate 
has to show support and the ability to get volunteers. You have to have a good team.” 79 
 Lewis stated that "I liked that the election was issue oriented and there was no 
added pressure of fundraising. I was able to focus on the message and the issues rather 
that the fundraising."80 Interestingly, he was the beneficiary of substantial independent 
expenditures opposing incumbent Cadigan.81 One observer noted that Cadigan was 
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privately funded and could not, therefore, receive matching funds. This had the effect of 
encouraging the independent spending in that race, and energized the conservative base 
in Albuquerque to the benefit of all of the more conservative candidates on the city-wide 
ballot.82 Lewis stated emphatically that in the future he would opt-in again “because the 
way the system is set up discourages not participating.”83 
 The other participating candidate was businessman Michael Cook in District 7, a 
newcomer to electoral campaigning who faced only token write-in opposition. 
 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
A. Alternatives to Albuquerque’s “Opposing Funds” Provision 
Supplemental matching funds in public campaign finance programs, which give 
participating candidates additional funding to reply to messages by well-funded, 
nonparticipating candidates and opposing independent groups, are also designed to give 
candidates an incentive to accept public financing, forego traditional fundraising and 
limit their campaign expenditures. These provisions, however, have also provided fodder 
for recent constitutional challenges in federal courts. These challenges may undermine 
the public financing programs that matching funds were specifically intended to 
strengthen. The U.S. Supreme Court will have the opportunity to determine the fate of 
supplemental matching funds in public financing programs across the country, perhaps 
before the end of its 2010-2011 term.  
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1. Albuquerque’s Supplemental Matching Fund Provision 
Candidates accepting public financing in Albuquerque receive an initial lump sum 
of public money for their campaigns after they are certified as participating candidates. 
The OEE also offers them additional funding of up to twice the amount of the original 
grant if funds spent by either (1) an independent group in opposition to a participating 
candidate or (2) an opposing, nonparticipating candidate “who has the highest total of 
Expenditures and supportive Independent Expenditures”84 exceed the amount of the grant 
received by a participating candidate, plus any seed money spent.85  
In other words, the OEE gives participants the ability to respond to well-funded 
attack messages, even though it does not allow participants to raise additional funds from 
private sources. Thus, supplemental matching funds, called “Opposing Funds” in the city 
charter, give candidates an incentive to opt into the program without fear that they will be 
left defenseless against well funded attacks.  
2. Federal Courts Divided on the Constitutionality of Matching Funds 
Several federal circuit courts have divided over whether to extend the Supreme 
Court’s 2008 holding in Davis v. FEC,86 which struck down a provision allowing certain 
federal candidates to raise additional private contributions, and invalidate supplemental 
matching fund provisions in public campaign financing programs. In Davis, the Supreme 
Court applied strict scrutiny to strike down the so-called Millionaire’s Amendment to the 
federal Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. That amendment provided that if a 
candidate for the United States Congress – running in an election in which all candidates 
are privately financed and subject to the same federal election rules – funded his or her 
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campaign with personal funds in excess of a specified threshold amount, then opposing 
candidates in the same race could raise private contributions under contribution limits 
that were treble the normal legal limits for federal campaigns. The Davis Court ruled that 
the political speech of a self-funded candidate was impermissibly chilled by this 
asymmetrical scheme, because spending by a wealthy candidate could trigger a benefit to 
his or her opponent, allowing that opponent to raise larger private contributions than the 
wealthy candidate could. 
The Supreme Court recently agreed to hear a challenge to a supplemental 
matching funds provision in Arizona’s program of statewide public campaign financing. 
Appellants argue that the supplemental matching funds available to participating 
candidates in Arizona, which are available when independent groups or opposing, 
nonparticipating candidates spend over a specified amount, are analogous to the 
asymmetrical contribution limits struck down in Davis and impermissibly chill the 
political speech of those groups and nonparticipating candidates (neither of whom are 
bound by the restrictions or regulations of the public financing program). McComish v. 
Bennett87 is scheduled for oral argument on March 28, 2011. 
The Ninth Circuit rejected the reasoning of the McComish appellants, because it 
determined that Arizona’s matching fund provision “places only a minimal or indirect 
burden on Plaintiffs' speech and that the Supreme Court's latest campaign finance 
decision, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission reaffirmed that intermediate 
scrutiny applies to such laws.” 88 The appellate court noted that “the Supreme Court has 
held that it is constitutional to subject candidates running against each other for the same 
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office to entirely different regulatory schemes when some candidates voluntarily choose 
to participate in a public financing system,”89 and that the public financing scheme 
approved by the Supreme Court in the seminal Buckley v. Valeo decision was “a 
congressional effort, not to abridge, restrict, or censor speech, but rather to use public 
money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participation in the electoral 
process, goals vital to a self-governing people.”90 It concluded that Arizona’s 
supplemental matching funds program did not create a burden on speech.  
The Ninth Circuit distinguished Davis “because it singled out the speakers to 
whom it applied based on their identity (wealth),”91 while Arizona’s “matching funds 
provision makes no such identity-based distinctions.”92 In other words, Arizona’s law 
dispenses supplemental funds to participating candidates whose privately-financed 
opponents spend over a certain amount, whether or not they have funded their campaigns 
personally. Because it does not “distinguish between different sources of nonparticipating 
candidates’ financing at all”93 the program places only an “indirect or minimal” burden 
on the speech of nonparticipating candidates.94  
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that Arizona’s matching funds are substantially 
related to Arizona’s interest in providing an incentive to candidates to participate in its 
public financing program, which furthered Arizona’s interest in deterring corruption or 
the appearance of corruption,95 recognized since 1976 by the Buckley court as a 
compelling governmental interest. It concluded that “[i]n this case, as in Buckley and 
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Citizens United, the burden that Plaintiffs allege is merely a theoretical chilling effect on 
donors who might dislike the statutory result of making a contribution or candidates who 
may seek a tactical advantage related to the release or timing of matching funds. The 
matching funds provision does not actually prevent anyone from speaking in the first 
place or cap campaign expenditures.”96 
 Two other federal circuit courts later disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s holding. 
The Second Circuit, ruling on a provision in Connecticut's public campaign financing 
program,97 and the Eleventh Circuit, in a ruling involving Florida's program,98 found that 
Davis makes the provision of matching funds in public campaign financing programs 
impermissible under the First Amendment. They identified a burden that “chilled” the 
free-speech rights of nonparticipating candidates and independent expenditure groups 
because matching funds in the public campaign finance programs are triggered by the 
spending of nonparticipating candidates or independent groups. Applying strict scrutiny, 
as did the Davis court, these federal appellate courts concluded that matching fund 
provisions fail because they “severely” burden the First Amendment interests of 
nonparticipating candidates and are not the least restrictive way for states to further the 
states’ acknowledged interest in fighting the appearance of corruption.  
 Supplemental matching fund provisions thus currently stand in a precarious 
position. If the U.S. Supreme Court reverses the Ninth Circuit in McComish, which 
seems possible because it refused to enjoin the district court's ruling invalidating the 
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matching funds provision,99 its ruling would undermine a key incentive for candidates to 
participate in public financing programs and undermine the stability of any such system.  
3. Four Proposed Solutions: 
The Supreme Court may uphold Arizona’s supplemental funding trigger, in which 
case this provision of Albuquerque’s law can remain intact. Should the Court declare 
Arizona’s trigger fund unconstitutional, however, CGS suggests four alternative reforms 
that each would circumvent the constitutional issue, eliminate this threat to 
Albuquerque’s program and strengthen the OEE for years to come. The suggested 
changes would give candidates incentives to participate in the city’s public financing 
program either through increased lump-sum grants, a generous public match for small 
private contributions, or the promise of supplemental funding not based on the 
expenditures of any opposing candidate or group. 
Albuquerque’s program of public funding of campaigns is strong. Every effort 
should be made to preserve it. 
Option (a): Repeal the current trigger mechanism and increase the dollar amount 
for grants.  
Under this option, Albuquerque would increase the amount of public funding 
available to participating candidates to at least $1.50 per voter. Increased funding would 
continue to make the program attractive to candidates, particularly in the absence of a 
promise of supplemental matching funds. All qualified candidates would receive larger 
lump sum grants and would be free to strategize their expenditures accordingly. This 
option would likely increase OEE expenditures, even if participation does not increase.  
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 Option (b): Adopt matching funds modeled on New York City’s system.  
In New York, the city matches small contributions ($175 or below)100 raised by 
participating candidates from private contributors at a $6-to-$1 ratio.101 This system 
requires participating candidates to demonstrate a broad base of support by raising a large 
number of small contributions. The generous match gives candidates a built-in incentive 
to participate, and taxpayers in New York find it attractive because their money is not 
wasted on frivolous candidates who cannot raise many small private contributions and 
will thus do not receive much public funding. This “hybrid” model of small private 
contributions and public funding is considered a legitimate alternative, even by those who 
are committed to clean money systems.102 Of course, it has the downside of requiring 
candidates to continue to fundraise throughout the campaign. 
 Option (c): Disperse additional grants when races which are “competitive.” 
 CGS alternatively proposes that the city consider retaining the supplemental 
funding aspect of the OOE but change its trigger mechanism from the current program, 
which relies on opponent spending over a specified amount, to a program based on a lack 
of voter information. This suggestion, like option (d) below, is an innovative yet untested 
approach developed by CGS. It would allow Albuquerque to continue to provide 
participating candidates with the incentive of supplemental funding. This option assumes 
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that voters would need additional information to cast an informed ballot. It is on that 
basis that supplemental funding would be dispersed, triggered by the competitiveness of 
the race in the relevant district.  
 Specifically, the city would increase to $1.50 or more the dollar amount per voter 
and dispense first-stage grants of 60% of the total amount possible for an election in a 
particular district. The city would disperse the remaining 40% of the available monies 
only if the result of a simple poll shows the voters need more election-related information 
to make up their minds. The poll should be conducted on the Friday four weeks before 
Election Day and would ask two or three questions at most.103 If the poll results show that 
a participating candidate was either ahead by 15 or fewer percentage points, or within 
that margin of the leader, AND had “educated the voters” (expended 50% or more of his 
or her initial grant by the day of the poll), the city would disperse supplemental funding 
to that participating candidate because the race was “competitive,” the assumption being 
that voters would benefit from more information prior to Election Day. Only those 
participating candidates who meet both criteria would receive supplemental funding. 
Privately funded candidates, of course, would have the opportunity to continue to raise 
additional contributions. 
Option (c) responds to the fact that Albuquerque has spent significant amounts of 
public funding over the past two election cycles in races that were lopsided.   
• In 2007, only District 6 had a campaign that arguably was competitive 
four weeks before Election Day, yet in two other districts (District 2 and 
District 4) candidates received and spent their entire grants. The winner in 
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District 2 won by 44 percentage points, and the winner in District 4 
prevailed by 62 percentage points.  
 
• In 2009, the race for mayor was very competitive four weeks before 
Election Day, but races in District 7 and District 9 were not; candidates in 
those races were still given full grants and those funds were spent. In 
District 7, the winner, facing only write-in competition, received 96% of 
the vote, and in District 9 the winner received 79% of the vote. 
 
If this option had been adopted prior to the 2009 municipal election and the grants were 
based on a formula of $1.50 per voter, this option would have resulted in the following 
scenarios: 
• The District 3 race would not have been considered competitive. 
Incumbent Isaac Benton used public financing to defeat a privately 
financed challenger by about 19 percentage points. Benton’s grant from 
the city was $29,400. Using the new scheme, Benton would have received 
a first-stage grant of $26,520, and could have been eligible, assuming he 
also met the expenditure threshold, to receive an additional $17,680 four 
weeks before Election Day in a competitive race (for a total of $44,200). 
Because the race was not within the 15 point competition threshold, no 
additional funding above his initial grant from the City would have been 
dispersed. In fact, he returned slightly more than $1,700 in unexpended 
funds to the OEE Fund.  
 
• The District 9 race also would not have been considered competitive. 
Incumbent Don Harris used public financing to defeat a privately financed 
challenger by about 58 percentage points. His grant was $32,811. Under 
this proposal, while he would have been eligible to receive close to 
$49,200 in a competitive race in which he additionally met the expenditure 
threshold, because his race was not competitive he would have received 
only an initial grant of $29,500, slightly less than the amount which was 
more than adequate to secure his victory in 2009. 
 
• In the 2009 mayoral race, the grants varied somewhat (based on the seed 
money raised) but the race among the three candidates was competitive 
throughout. Thus, each candidate would have received $315,000 initially 
and only if a particular candidate had expended $157,000 by the fourth 
Friday before Election Day (in other words, had not held back significant 
funding but had “educated” the voters) would additional public funding 
have been released to him. Candidates would have had an incentive to 
participate because there would be clear rules to assure the release of 
supplemental funding. The most a candidate would have been able to 
spend under this scenario would have been $525,000.  
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 Option (d): Disperse supplemental funding when there are substantial numbers of 
“undecided” voters four weeks before an election. 
 Option (d) is another innovative approach, devised by CGS, which has not been 
tested in the courts; nevertheless, it also offers the promise of improving voter 
information and providing participating candidates the significant incentive of additional 
funding to communicate their messages. 
 As in option (c), the city would calculate grants for publicly financed campaigns 
using a formula of $1.50 per voter or more. Grants would be dispersed in two stages, with 
the first stage comprising 60% of the total amount possible for an election in a particular 
district. The city would disperse the remaining 40% of the available monies only if the 
result of a simple poll shows the voters needed more election-related information to make 
up their minds. The poll would be conducted in the relevant districts on the Friday four 
weeks prior to Election Day. It would simply ask the voter whether he or she has already 
decided for whom to vote, or whether the voter is “undecided.” If the poll results indicate 
that 15% or more104 of the voters queried were undecided AND a participating candidate 
had expended 50% or more of his or her initial grant by the day of the poll, then the city 
would distribute supplemental funding to the participating candidate(s) in that district 
who meet the expenditure threshold, enabling them to continue to communicate their 
messages. Privately funded candidates would have the opportunity to continue to raise 
additional contributions. 
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 The trigger mechanism suggested here assumes that a significant number of 
undecided voters would benefit from further campaign-related information prior to 
Election Day, and it is on that basis that supplemental funding would be dispersed. This 
option would be easy to implement, because the city would only ask one question in the 
poll: “Have you decided who you will vote for in the [relevant district] race?” It would 
not “chill” the speech of non-participating candidates because it would not be triggered 
by non-participating candidates’ expenditures. 
  Assumptions that support both options (c) and (d):  
 Both options (c) and (d) would continue the city’s stated goals to  
(1) Deter corruption or its appearance,  
(2) Encourage participation in the OEE, and  
(3) Strengthen confidence in governmental and election processes.  
In addition, each suggestion would be supported by a strong governmental interest in 
allowing candidates to provide voters with additional information as the basis for release 
of supplemental funding, rather than basing such funding on the calculation of an 
opponent’s spending, thereby avoiding a trigger mechanism that is vulnerable to 
constitutional challenge. 
Further, because these options recognize the government’s interest in creating an 
informed electorate, they directly further the principles set forth in Buckley that the ability 
of citizens to “make informed choices among the candidates for office is essential . . .”105 
and that “debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”106 
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CGS suggests that, whether based on a close “competitive” race or a significant 
bloc of “undecided” voters, 15 percentage points represents a reasonable bright line to 
justify the further expense of taxpayer monies. Under either option, the need for 
additional voter information would directly link to the Buckley Court’s finding that public 
funding of campaigns is appropriate to “enlarge public discussion and participation in the 
electoral process.”107  
Either approach requires the city to increase the total amount of its OEE grants to 
$1.50 or more per voter, but it would not disperse any grant in a lump sum (we suggest 
that only 60% be dispersed in the first stage), and it might not disperse a significant part 
of the budgeted funds at all. Instead, the city would award grants in two stages, the 
second stage being based on a demonstrated need for more money to be spent in a 
particular race, and only on that basis. This would be “demonstrated” by (i) requiring that 
candidates expend a certain percentage of their initial grant (we suggest 50%) by the date 
of the poll, so that candidates only receive supplemental funding if they have sought to 
educate voters in the early weeks of the campaign, and (ii) conducting a simple poll in the 
relevant district, the question(s) always being the same,108 to determine if the race 
warrants further expenditures in order to give citizens more campaign information before 
voting on Election Day. In races that do not meet the determined threshold, additional 
funds would be withheld and not spent, ultimately saving the city money.  
The promise of a supplemental, second-tier grant, based on a larger total grant 
made possible by increasing the amount of public funding per voter, would provide an 
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important incentive to candidates to opt-in to the OEE at the beginning of the campaign 
cycle. Because supplemental funding would be available only in certain races, based on 
objective poll results, the plan would be tailored to protect the city’s resources.  
Albuquerque’s political culture does not favor overspending – no mayoral 
candidate spent more than $360,000 in 2009. Mandatory audits, also recommended in 
this report, would help assure that expenditures are for legitimate campaign purposes. But 
these proposals would still hold out sufficient grant amounts to provide participating 
candidates with an attractive alternative to fundraising from private sources. Increasing 
participation has been one of OEE’s strengths in the last two election cycles and is a 
benefit to Albuquerque voters. The fact that all three 2009 mayoral candidates 
participated in the OEE allowed them to avoid the taint of undue influence by special 
interests, a significant achievement at any level of politics. 
           Instituting either of these two-tiered approaches to triggered supplemental funding 
of publicly financed candidates would require city charter changes that would:  
 (1) Determine what percentage of the total funding available to an OEE 
participant will be released in the first-tier grant. CGS suggests 60% of the grant 
theoretically available be released to candidates initially. 
(2) Define the percentage of  the percentage “competitive gap” or “undecided” 
poll respondents in a race that would trigger the release of supplemental funds. CGS 
recommends 15% in either option. 
(3) Determine the day the poll would be conducted. CGS recommends the Friday 
of the fourth week before Election Day and suggests the poll be called the Four Week 
Poll. 
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(4) Determine when the supplemental grants would be dispersed. CGS 
recommends the Monday following the Four Week Poll.  
(5) Determine an appropriate percentage of the grant and the date by which it 
must be expended in order for the publicly financed candidate to be eligible for 
supplemental funding based on poll results. CGS recommends that 50% of the initial 
grant be required to be expended by the day of the Four Week Poll. 
(6) Embed the perennial poll question(s), intended to measure the need for further 
voter information in particular races, in the City Charter. Candidates and voters alike will 
thus have notice of the exact questions to be asked of respondents. 
 B. Extend Period to Gather Mayoral Qualifying Contributions by Four 
Weeks 
The issue of the amount of time for mayoral candidates to collect qualifying 
contributions should be addressed by the city council before the next mayoral election 
cycle begins. Whether candidates are required to gather too many contributions in too 
abbreviated a period, particularly candidates who lack city-wide name recognition before 
the qualifying period begins, or whether the task is made reasonably difficult to guard 
against funding candidates who do not have demonstrated broad appeal, should be 
clarified for candidates and voters alike. 
Other jurisdictions have statutes that provide much longer periods of time in 
which candidates gather qualifying contributions. In comparably sized Portland, 
Oregon,109 for example, candidates in its public financing program are allowed four and 
one-half months to gather qualifying signatures. It should be noted that in Portland all six 
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of the elected officers, not just candidates for mayor, run at large, and candidates in 
Portland need only gather 1,500 qualifying contributions.  
  Proposed Solution: 
 The city should extend the time frame for gathering $5 contributions by mayoral 
candidates, who must obtain significantly more of these contributions than their city 
council counterparts. By adding four weeks to the current six weeks, candidates without 
city-wide name recognition will be able to develop networks of support throughout the 
city and gather the required number of contributions, currently a daunting task for 
mayoral candidates simply because the number of required contributions is so high. 
C. Alternate Sources of OEE Funding  
The city should consider using additional funds from sources outside the General 
Fund, together with the designated one-tenth of one percent from the General Fund, as a 
way to ensure that the Fund will be able to accommodate all candidates who can qualify. 
As Councilor Benton has declared, “The program has worked well overall. We will 
address any funding issues. It’s the cost of good government.”110  
Proposed Solution: 
A possible source, perhaps banking both on widespread voter support for the OEE 
and on Albuquerque’s status as one of the nation’s most affordable places to visit, might 
be a small fee on room occupancy (“fifteen cents -- $0.15 -- for clean elections” ) within 
the city limits. Based on a 50% occupancy rate for approximately 15,000 hotel rooms, a 
fifteen cent per night fee would generate $410,625 annually to supplement the fund.111 
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Other possible sources are suggested in the 2003 CGS publication Public Financing of 
Elections: Where to Get the Money?112 
D. Audits of Campaign Spending 
OEE participants are not audited after the election to determine whether they have 
spent public funds appropriately. Auditing would reinforce the value of the program.  
Campaign finance disclosure reports, required under the Election Code of all 
candidates whether or not participating in the OEE, currently are submitted to the clerk 
and reviewed during the campaign by an independent contractor, who has access to 
campaign bank statements and bank accounts.113 The contractor, a certified public 
accountant, determines if the forms properly list contributions and expenditures and is 
responsible for identifying instances of non-compliance, such as missing information for 
a contributor. In such cases, the candidate involved receives a notification letter and is 
given a 10-day period to correct the identified error.114  
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In 2007 and 2009, the city followed this procedure to review the campaign 
finance disclosure reports for all candidates, whether or not participating in the OEE. The 
clerk for the 2009 election noted that, with respect to that race, all of the identified errors 
involved very minor omissions that were corrected within the 10-day time frame. Indeed, 
there were only a handful of violations, and they occurred early in the campaign. He 
believes that the lack of many problems noted later in the campaign resulted from 
campaign managers becoming more familiar with Albuquerque’s unique rules.115  
This type of monitoring differs greatly from the comprehensive audits that should 
be conducted with respect to the expenditures of participating OEE candidates. In the 
interest of assuring that taxpayer money is being judiciously spent – as opposed to being 
just spent – audits specifically geared toward verifying that expenditures are legitimate 
campaign expenditures should be added to the city’s necessary oversight. 
Because the current system is not designed to oversee the propriety of candidate 
spending, there is an unintentional gap in accountability between the taxpayers and the 
candidates. Citizens simply do not know if their dollars are being spent appropriately and, 
thus, whether the OEE is meeting its stated goals.   
The city charter outlines permissible and impermissible uses of OEE funds.116 It 
enumerates issues that should be the focus of post-election oversight by the city, 
including a prohibition on personal use of campaign funds, ban on using OEE funds to 
retire a previous campaign debt, purchase of certain property by a campaign, 
                                                 
115
 Additionally, the regulations of the Board of Ethics and Campaign Practices call for a mandatory pre-
election meeting to permit inspection and/or audit of each candidates campaign financial records. Rules & 
Regulations of the Board of Ethics & Campaign Practices, Section 5 (M). This requirement was described 
by Mr. Autio as “archaic,” because the reports are online. He said that in 2009 there was no public input at 
all during this meeting. Interview with City Clerk Autio, September 2010. 
116
 Charter, Art. XVI, Section 8. 
50 
compensation to campaign staff, forfeiture of unspent seed money and return of 
unexpended funds within a two-week time frame after Election Day.  
Proposed Solution: 
The credibility of the OEE depends on city-wide support from the taxpayers. The 
Office of the Independent Auditor routinely reviews city programs and is well suited to 
conduct post-election audits of campaigns funded by the OEE. The council should 
mandate that the city auditor undertake this task. These audits should review the complete 
records of all participating candidates to verify that taxpayer funds are appropriately 
spent and to identify problem areas for the Council. 
 E. Verification of Signatures 
The former city clerk reported that the significant task of verifying signatures, to 
determine whether individual candidates had qualified for grants under the OEE, was a 
burden on his small office. To provide the most accurate verification possible of 
qualifying contributions, the policy of the city clerk is to verify every signature, rather 
than to verify only a random sample.117 In 2009, this tremendous burden included the 
verification of about 20,000 individual signatures. 
The clerk specifically cited the difficulty of linking a particular $5 qualifying 
contribution to a particular signature, because many contributors used cash. As he noted, 
in those cases there is no way to assure that the person who signed the affidavit gave the 
$5. The bills can be bundled together and are not distinguishable. This issue, and the 
possibility that the current process is open to abuse, was also raised by one of the 
potential candidates for mayor who dropped out of the race.  
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 Interview with City Clerk Autio, September 2010.  
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Proposed Solution: 
To address this concern, Form 5 should be re-written to clearly state the 
transaction between the voter and the candidate, the reason for the transaction, that the 
funds given are those of the voter, the identifying information for both the voter and the 
candidate or agent, and awareness of the penalty for committing perjury. A copy of 
proposed language for Form 5 appears in the Appendix. A clear declaration that a voter 
has made the $5 contribution, under penalty of perjury, would minimize abuse of this 
important phase of candidate qualification. 
F. Clearer Navigation and Identifying Labels on the Clerk’s Website  
Mayor Berry vigorously advocates increased transparency for Albuquerque city 
government on the city’s web site. Accordingly, the city should significantly clarify basic 
information about city elections and campaign finance for web site visitors, particularly 
because the OEE is currently “policed” via complaint. Thus, it is important that 
information on campaign financing is properly labeled and clearly displayed to make it 
accessible. 
Former and present city clerks agree that the current web site is showing its age. 
Finding specific disclosure records filed by the candidates and measure finance 
committees on the city’s web site is difficult. The current system is cumbersome to use, 
because its information is not organized in an intuitive way, and campaign finance 
information is sorted through a number of software filters that are poorly labeled.118 
Furthermore, the major links to the reports are not defined in terms of what information 
they lead to and why that particular information has been filtered in that particular way 
                                                 
118
 An additional admittedly minor complaint is that the pull-down list of candidates is organized 
alphabetically by first name. The more intuitive approach would be to alphabetize this list by the 
candidates’ last names. 
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(“Current Campaign Records,” “All Campaign Records,” “Summary Audit Reports,” 
etc.). There is no guide to inform visitors about required content in the various reports 
submitted (“Q1,” “M1,” “S1,” etc.). There is no way to tell if a measure finance 
committee has spent its funds supporting or opposing any particular candidate. The 
reports available are not sortable. Researchers also were not able to open any requested 
document in excel form. 
Despite this, comprehensive information does exist for the visitor if he or she can 
find it among the various groupings of campaign finance reports, and according to the 
clerk this information is available instantaneously once it is submitted by the 
candidate.119 
One additional note: the clerk’s web site contains a number of very helpful 
documents, including many which provided historical context, that were hidden from 
view unless a visitor happened to press a link on the “Elections” page on the City Clerk’s 
site for “procedures” (which was embedded in the sentence: “The City Clerk established 
campaign procedures that publicly financed candidates for political office follow under 
the Open and Ethical Election Code.”).  A list of very helpful documents was displayed. 
Unfortunately, that link has been removed recently and the site no longer informs tell 
visitors how to find this trove of documentary information. 
Proposed Solution: 
The most basic change would edit the first page of the city’s web site so that 
visitors would see a link for “City Elections Information” instead of the current 
“Upcoming Elections,” which is misleading and incomplete. Once the visitor has 
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navigated to the city clerk’s section of the web site, there should be clear, headline-type 
links leading visitors to: 
• Important dates for candidates and voters, and specific information about 
upcoming elections.  
• Campaign finance disclosure reports for candidates and committees, 
including a legend explaining (1) the substance of the reports that can be 
found under specific headings and (2) what the abbreviations on the 
reports stand for (i.e., “S1,” “M2,” etc.). 
• Archived information about past elections, including complete lists of 
candidates and comprehensive election results. 
• The City Charter and all regulations relating to municipal elections. 
• A historic archive of all statutes and other ordinances, regulations, court 
cases, and reports relating Albuquerque’s municipal elections.  
These changes would not be difficult to implement, and would greatly enhance 
the accessibility of the information that is already there. 
 G. Improved Disclosure Reports 
Candidates, including those running for mayor, did not have to decide whether 
they would run until nominating petitions were due on April 28, 2009. Citizens could not 
follow early contributions and expenditures, however, because the city’s campaign 
finance reporting system has software flaws that make some important information 
difficult, if not impossible, to retrieve. Specifically, there are no dates displayed to 
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website visitors for individual transactions, despite the fact that candidates are required to 
keep records of “all financial records pertinent to the campaign.”120 
 By far the most confusing example was that of then incumbent, Mayor Martin 
Chavez. Voters interested in how his fundraising efforts would comply with the OEE 
were probably left scratching their heads. The Mayor filed quarterly disclosure reports as 
a current office holder, including those due for 2008. In addition, he filed OEE reports on 
seed money contributions and in-kind contributions on January 1, 2009, and April 1, 
2009. These reports, like all disclosure reports posted on the city clerk’s web site, were 
immediately available to interested citizens when they were electronically filed.  
Even in their most final form, however, none of the reports available on the city’s 
web site included the date of any transaction. It was therefore nearly impossible to follow 
the money raised and spent by the Mayor from the first report required of him in 2009 to 
the first campaign finance report required of all candidates on July 17, 2009. In a January 
15, 2009, quarterly report, the Mayor reported contributions of $41,050 and expenditures 
of exactly the same amount, but there are no dates for any contribution or expenditure. 
Voters were left in the dark about when this money actually was raised or spent. 
In addition, site visitors were likely perplexed because news reports told them that 
the Mayor had gathered all the necessary $5 qualifying contributions by March 6, 2009121 
but apparently had done so without raising or spending any seed money.122 At the same 
time, other candidates reported raising and spending significant amounts of seed money 
                                                 
120
 Charter, Art.XIII, Section 4 (J) (2). 
121
 Marjorie Childress, “ABQ Mayoral Candidates Make Progress on $5 Contributions – and Mayor 
Chavez is Already Done,” The New Mexico Independent, March 6, 2009. 
122
 Summary Audit Reports: M1, M1 and Q3. In the report labeled Q3, Chavez reported that “contributions 
and expenditures for the third quarter, related to my re-election, are reported in the S-1 campaign disclosure 
report filed on July 17, 2009.” There is no Q2 report (which was due April 15, 2009) on the City’s web site; 
there are no dates listed for contributions and expenditures listed in the S1 report. 
http://cognosout.cabq.gov/cognos8/cgi-bin/cognos.cgi.  
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to obtain qualifying contributions. State Senator Richard Romero raised $34,280 in seed 
money and expended $25,454, according to reports he filed on January 1 and April 1, 
2009. State Representative Richard Berry raised $23,936 in seed money and spent 
$8,316. Councilor M. Debbie O’Malley raised $21,900 in seed money and spent $16,139, 
before she withdrew from the mayoral race on March 14. Councilor Michael Cadigan 
raised $9,460 in seed money and spent $8,286, before he also withdrew on March 16, 
2009.123 Romero and Berry turned in sufficient qualifying contributions late in March 
2009. 
Proposed Solution: 
Require that each disclosure report electronically filed with the city clerk include 
the date of each individual transaction, whether it is a contribution or expenditure, and 
show the dates on the reports that are accessible by voters. The only dates currently 
associated with the campaign finance information on the web site are those upon which 
reports are due. This is not an appropriate level of information in a system that holds 
itself out to voters as the source of campaign spending information in general, and should 
take pains specifically to clarify the spending of taxpayer dollars with regard to publically 
funded campaigns. It also falls short of best practices for campaign finance disclosure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
123
 The data on seed money contributions and qualifying period expenditures was retrieved from M1 and 
M2 reports for the candidates indicated found at http://cognosout.cabq.gov/cognos8/cgi-bin/cognos.cgi.  
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VI. FINDINGS 
 
 Since its implementation,  
• The OEE has dramatically reduced expenditures in municipal campaigns 
and restored spending levels that are acceptable to city residents. 
• Campaigns have been characterized by a vigorous debate of issues, rather 
than by aggressive media campaigns by incumbents, well funded by 
special interests. 
• The OEE has been used by more than 60% of candidates appearing on the 
municipal ballot, including all three mayoral candidates in 2009.  
• Sitting elected officials have overwhelmingly used the OEE: eight of the 
ten current elected officials were program participants, including three 
newcomers to the municipal stage of whom two were newcomers to 
elected politics. 
• There has been no apparent misuse of OEE funds. 
• Participating candidates have not exceeded expenditures limits. 
• Opposing funds, while they have been used just once and without effect in 
that race, have perhaps helped to limit campaign spending as privately-
funded candidates and measure finance committees appear to have 
moderated their spending. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
 CGS believes that Albuquerque's Open and Ethical Election program can meet the 
challenges that lie ahead and remain a stable program for years to come. Our 
recommendations will help assure that the program will continue to achieve its ambitious 
goals. 
The citizens of Albuquerque should be proud of their impressive civic 
achievement in adopting and implementing the Open and Ethical Elections program. 
Their determination to reduce expenditures in municipal campaigns has been richly 
rewarded. The long-term prospects of the OEE, however, will depend on the city's careful 
stewardship to assure that its fundamental goals continue to be met. With minor course 
corrections, the OEE will stand as a model for other municipalities where citizens strive 
to gain control of the distorting effects of money in civic elections.  
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Appendix  
 
FORM 5 
 
My signature represents that on this date I declare, under penalty of perjury, that I am a 
registered voter in the City of Albuquerque and live in Council District ____. I provided a 
$5 contribution to support the allocation of public funds to the candidate named below. 
 
I personally contributed $5 of my own money, in cash or by check, and for which I 
received no compensation, to _______________________________, a candidate running 
for [insert appropriate race], in the municipal election to be held on [insert date], or 
his/her agent, ____________________ [insert name of contribution gatherer].  
 
I understand that if any part of this declaration is untrue, I will be subject to penalties and 
fined a minimum of [a deterrent amount as determined by the Council]. 
 
 
DATE:_______________ SIGNED:_______________________________________ 
 
 REGISTERED NAME OF VOTER:____________________________________ 
 
 REGISTERED ADDRESS OF VOTER:_________________________________ 
 
     __________________________________________ 
  
CANDIDATE PETITION SIGNED:_____YES 
 
                _____NO  
 
 
I witnessed the signature of this voter and personally received a $5 qualifying 
contribution from him/her on this date. I gave nothing of value in return. 
 
 
DATE:_______________ SIGNED:________________________________________ 
 
 NAME OF CANDIDATE:____________________________________________ 
 
 NAME OF AGENT (if applicable):_____________________________________ 
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Citizens Win concludes that Albuquerque‘s new system of public campaign financing for 
municipal elections has been markedly successful. Eight of the city’s ten currently elected 
officials accepted public financing to conduct their campaigns in the last two elections. 
Candidates decreased their spending. Campaigns focused on issues not fundraising. Large, 
privately funded campaigns did not materialize. Office holders reported they would accept 
public financing again instead of raising private donations. 
Citizens Win recommends that Albuquerque consider two innovative CGS proposals to 
give candidates additional public funding when voters lack sufficient information to make 
informed choices four weeks before the election. Either approach would encourage candidates 
to participate in the city’s public campaign financing program without implicating the First 
Amendment rights of high-sending opponents or other groups.
Citizens Win also recommends that mayoral candidates receive four extra weeks to gather 
$5 qualifying contributions. The city should conduct mandatory audits of the records of all 
participating candidates after each election campaign. And the city should upgrade its website 
to make campaign disclosure reports more accessible and comprehensible.
Citizens Win is one in a series of CGS reports on public campaign financing programs in states 
and cities, including Florida, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Carolina, Wisconsin, 
Los Angeles, New York City, Portland, Suffolk County New York, San Francisco and Tucson.
www.cgs.org
CGS helps civic organizations, decision-makers and the media to strengthen democracy and 
improve government processes by providing rigorous research, nonpartisan analysis, strategic 
consulting and innovative media models of public information and civic engagement.
Generous funding from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund made this report possible.
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